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Interbank Lending and the Spread of Bank Failures:

A Network Model of Systemic Risk�

Andreas Krausea,∗, Simone Giansantea 
aSchool of Management, University of Bath, Bath BA2 7AY, Great Britain 
Abstract 
We model a stylized banking system where banks are characterized by the amount of capital, cash reserves and their 
exposure to the interbank loan market as borrowers as well as lenders. A network of interbank lending is established 
that is used as a transmission mechanism for the failure of banks through the system. We trigger a potential banking 
crisis by exogenously failing a bank and investigate the spread of this failure within the banking system. We ﬁnd 
the obvious result that the size of the bank initially failing is the dominant factor whether contagion occurs, but for 
the extent of its spread the characteristics of the network of interbank loans are most important. These results have 
implications for the regulation of banking systems that are brieﬂy discussed, most notably that a reliance on balance 
sheet regulations is not suﬃcient but must be supplemented by considerations for the structure of ﬁnancial linkages 
between banks. 
Keywords: interbank loans, banking crises, systemic risk, network topology, tiering, ”too big to fail” 
1 ”We [believed] the problem would come from the failure of an individual institution. That was 
2 the big mistake. We didn’t understand just how entangled things were.” 
3 Gordon Brown, former British Prime Minister at the Institute for New Economic Thinking’s Bretton Woods Confer­
4 ence on 9 April 2011. 
5 
6 1. Introduction 
7 The current ﬁnancial crisis has raised questions about the adequacy of ﬁnancial regulation to ensure the stability 
8 of the banking system. A particular feature was the threat of systemic risk, where the failure of one bank spreads to 
9 other banks, arising from ﬁnancial links between them. These ﬁnancial links, either through interbank loans, payment 
10 systems or OTC derivatives positions, have received signiﬁcant attention in the literature in recent years, although a 
11 thorough analysis of their impact on systemic risk is still outstanding. In this paper we seek to develop a model of 
12 such ﬁnancial linkages and investigate how they contribute to the spread of bank failures. This study is the ﬁrst of its 
13 kind that seeks to explicitly evaluate the role of the network structure of interbank loans as well as the balance sheet 
14 structure of individual banks in the spread of bank failures. In contrast to previous contributions we do not assume all 
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15 banks to be identical, have random links with each other or to have interbank loans of equal sizes, but rather allow the 
16 characteristics of banks and their interactions to vary in a much more realistic setting that captures more aspects of 
17 real banking systems. 
18 Systemic risk is deﬁned by the Bank for International Settlements as ”the risk that the failure of a participant 
19 to meet its contractual obligations may in turn cause other participants to default with a chain reaction leading to 
20 broader ﬁnancial diﬃculties”, Bank for International Settlements (1994). A common approach to modeling systemic 
21 risk is that of bank runs, where customers loose conﬁdence in a bank and withdraw their deposits. Observing a run 
22 on one bank then undermines conﬁdence in other banks which in turn may suﬀer a bank run, thus spreading the 
23 problems beyond the initially aﬀected bank, although no fundamental reason for this development is present. An 
24 alternative approach is to assume a common exogenous shock that aﬀects all banks, e. g. a currency crisis, which 
25 as a consequence of this common shock experience a large number of failures, see e. g. Kaufman and Scott (2003) 
26 and Kaufmann (2005) for a non-technical overview. While such origins of crises are certainly relevant, the focus of 
27 this paper will be the spread of failures due to direct and indirect ﬁnancial linkages between banks as arising from 
28 interbank loans or similar ﬁnancial connections such as OTC derivatives markets. 
29 The following section provides a brief overview of the current research on the relation of systemic risk and in­
30 terbank loans, together with an outline of the empirical properties of the interbank loan market before we introduce 
31 the model investigated developed in section 3. The variables considered in our subsequent analysis are described in 
32 section 4 and section 5 shows how we derive the main factors that can be identiﬁed from those variables in a principal 
33 components analysis. The main results of our model are discussed in section 6 with policy implications of these re­
34 sults being outlined in section 7. Finally section 8 concludes our ﬁndings and makes numerous suggestions for further 
35 research. 
36 2. Literature on the interbank loan market 
37 This section will provide a brief overview of the current state of the literature on systemic risk arising from 
38 interbank loans and in the second part outline the main empirical characteristics of banking systems and interbank 
39 loans. 
40 2.1. Relevance of interbank loans for systemic risk assessment 
41 Systemic risks are one of the main concerns of central banks and bank regulators, consequently the amount of work 
42 conducted in this area is signiﬁcant; it also serves as the main justiﬁcation for the tight regulation of bank activities. 
43 This section seeks to provide a brief overview of some of the works conducted in this area and from there point out the 
44 diﬀerences to the model we develop in this paper. A number of contributions seek to provide an overview of diﬀerent 
45 origins and forms of systemic risks and the associated modeling approaches as well as empirical evidence, e. g. Bandt 
46 and Hartmann (2000), Kaufman and Scott (2003), or Chan-Lau et al. (2009). 
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47
 A signiﬁcant part of the theoretical models developed over the years investigate the impact reduced liquidity has on

48
 the spread of bank failures. The idea in such models is that banks suﬀer losses in the value of their assets due to ”ﬁre

49
 sales” arising from the liquidations by failing banks. This also reduces the value of the assets of non-failing banks,

50
 which can lead to losses exceeding their capital base and they might fail subsequently, see Allen and Gale (2001) and

51
 Diamond and Rajan (2005). Another strand of literature models the interbank lending and how it can reduce systemic

52
 risk. They do so either by providing incentives to banks to monitor each other’s behavior as the exposure to interbank

53
 loans makes them susceptible to any other bank failing as in Rochet and Tirole (1996), or as a means to cushion the

54
 impact of any withdrawals from depositors as shown by Freixas et al. (2000). An empirical investigation supporting

55
 such models has been conducted by Cocco et al. (2009). It has also been shown by Eichberger and Summer (2005)

56
 that an increase in capital adequacy can actually increase systemic risks in equilibrium. A common feature of these

57
 models is that they are equilibrium models and while interactions with other banks are acknowledged, they are not

58
 explicitly modeled and a direct investigation into the impact of interbank loans are not possible, in particular the

59 structure and properties of the network cannot be considered in those models. 
60
 More recently models have become popular that explicitly model the ﬁnancial connections between banks as

61
 networks and employ simulation techniques to assess the spread of any bank failures. A general overview of the

62
 issues surrounding such modeling techniques is given by Haldane (2009). The range of network models applied is

63
 wide; for example in Vivier-Lirimont (2004) we ﬁnd a contribution that investigates the determination of the optimal

64
 network structure of interbank loans from a bank’s perspective. While this approach might allow us to explain the

65
 existence of speciﬁc network structures we observe, it does not directly contribute to our understanding of systemic

66
 risk. On the other hand, there exist a range of models that concentrate on the implications of liquidity eﬀects, similar

67
 to the equilibrium models discussed in the previous paragraph, see e. g. Cifuentes et al. (2005) and Iori et al. (2006).

68
 The diﬀerence of these models compared to those mentioned in the previous paragraph is that these models explicitly

69
 use the network structure of ﬁnancial connections to assess the spread of bank failures arising from to liquidity eﬀects.

70
 While the models considered thus far only model the banks themselves in a rudimentary way, other models such

71
 as those in Eboli (2007), Gai and Kapadia (2007), Nier et al. (2007), and Battiston et al. (2009), and May and

72
 Arinaminpathy (2010) explicitly include the balance sheets of banks and how the failure of a bank spreads through

73
 interbank loans in the banking system via losses they incur in their balance sheets. These models make a variety of

74
 assumptions on the network structure, properties of the banks and how failures spread. Some common assumptions

75
 are an Erdo¨s-Renyi random network of interactions between banks, all banks having the same size, all banks having

76
 the same capital base, or all interbank loans to be for an identical amount, thus not taking into account empirical facts

77
 about real banking systems as well as the heterogeneity of banks. Furthermore, given the restrictive nature of their

78
 assumptions, these contributions do not provide a comprehensive analysis of the determinants of banking crises and

79
 their extent, often relying on mean-ﬁeld approximations to derive results based on a small number of parameters. A

80 common ﬁnding in such models is that a higher interconnection between banks can increase the spread of failure, 
81 although for very high interconnections this can reduce again. A somewhat more obvious result is that a higher capital 
3 
82 base reduces the extent of a banking crisis. 
83 An attempt to provide more insights on the relevance of the network structure for the spread of banking failures is 
84 provided in Sui (2009); this contribution also investigates the relevance of the originator of the crisis in a very stylized 
85 model. Finally, Canedo and Jaramillo (2009a) focus on the distribution of losses arising from such a model. 
86 In addition to the mostly theoretical papers above, a signiﬁcant number of empirical contributions exist that seek 
87 to investigate the vulnerability of a speciﬁc banking system to systemic risks. Most of such papers focus on the 
88 banking systems of individual countries and either use the actual structure of interbank loans, usually obtained from 
89 central bank sources, or estimate this structure before conducting their empirical analysis. The contributions in this 
90 ﬁeld include Sheldon and Maurer (1999), Blavarg and Nimander (2002), Wells (2002), Boss et al. (2004b), Graf et al. 
91 (2004), Upper and Worms (2004), Iyer and Peydro-Alcalde (2005), Mistrulli (2005), Elsinger et al. (2001), Elsinger 
92 et al. (2006), Gropp et al. (2006), Iori et al. (2006), Lelyveld and Liedorp (2006), Mu¨ller (2006), Degryse and Nguyen 
93 (2007), Estrada and Morales (2008), Canedo and Jaramillo (2009b), and Toivanen (2009). A general overview of the 
94 empirical methodology and the results obtained in many of the papers mentioned before can be found in Upper (2007). 
95 We observe generally a wide range of vulnerability of banking systems to systemic risks arising from interbank loans, 
96 which is not surprising given the very diﬀerent properties of the banking systems in each country. This disparity in 
97 results conﬁrms the need for a comprehensive tool for analyzing the systemic risks in a banking system. 
98 Apart from works that directly evaluate systemic risks arising from interbank loans in banking systems, a number 
99 of investigations have been conducted in related areas that can inform the modeling and interpretation of results: 
100
 payment networks in Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Furﬁne (2000) and May et al. (2008), counter party exposures in

101
 credit default swaps in Markose et al. (2010) or trade credits between companies as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997),

102
 and Battiston et al. (2007). After brieﬂy looking at the empirical structure of the interbank loan market, the coming

103
 section will present the model used during our analysis and explicitly point out those aspects that are missing from

104
 other contributions and may allow us to further enhance our understanding of contagion in banking systems using

105
 a wide range of characteristics. We will allow our model to exhibit a banking system with heterogenous banks of

106
 diﬀerent sizes, diﬀerent balance sheet structures, diﬀerent interbank loan sizes, and also diﬀerent network topologies

107 as can be commonly found in real markets. 
108 2.2. The structure of the interbank market 
109 Empirical studies on interbank loan networks show that connections between banks exhibit a powerlaw tail1 as 
110 established in Boss et al. (2004a), amongst others. Sorama¨ki et al. (2007) and Becher et al. (2008) analyze the US 
111 FedWire system that consists of more than 9000 banks and ﬁnd a power law exponent of 1.76 for the outdegree. 
112
 Similarly, ? and Cajueiro and Tabak (2008) analyze the Austrian interbank market, showing a degree distribution

113
 that follows a power law with a power law exponent 1.85 among the 900 banks observed from 2000 to 2003; the

1A random variable x follows a power law distribution if Prob(x < v) ∝ v−λ, where λ denotes the power law exponent and λ 
1 is denoted the 
tail index. A distribution has a power law tail if for suﬃciently large v the distribution is a power law distribution. A smaller power law exponent 
corresponds to a fatter tail, i.e. more extremely large observations. 
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Figure 1: Empirical properties of interbank loan networks of selected countries 
114 investigation by Edson and Cont (2010) ﬁnds interconnections in the Brazilian banking system to exhibit a power 
115 law exponent in the range of 2.23-3.37 for the about 600 banks from June 2007 to November 2008. Smaller banking 
116 systems like the UK and Italian market, as studied by Becher et al. (2008) and Iori et al. (2008), are characterized 
117 by a high level of tiering, i. e. a few banks dominate the majority of connections with a long tail in the distribution 
118 of links among banks. The Swiss interbank network as analyzed in Mu¨ller (2006) showed a relatively small system 
119 of approximately 100 Swiss banks with a much more skewed distribution of links than the other systems. It is 
120 characterized by only two big banks holding a dominant position in the interbank loan market, which would imply 
121 a small power law exponent. Figure 1 illustrates the size of power law exponent and the size of the banking system 
122 of selected countries. We observe that banking systems are characterized by a wide range of power law exponents 
123 in the distribution of the size of banks as well as their interconnections. These ﬁndings make the assumption of 
124 random networks as well as assuming banks of equal size very questionable if we want to gain an understanding of 
125 the properties of banking crises. 
126 Tiering properties of interbank markets are analyzed in detail in the much larger banking system of Germany by 
127 Craig and von Peter (2010). They develop a core-periphery model in order to identify the tiering structure of a system 
128 and showed the highly tiered structure of the German network in which the core comprises only 2% of the banks in 
129 the system. This structure appears to be very consistent over time when using data on bilateral exposures from 1999 
130 to 2007. 
131 The results from these empirical investigations, which can be assumed to be valid in principle for most banking 
132 systems, provides us with some guidance on the properties of the network structure as well as the size of banks that 
133 we should be able to use in our model. The lack of publicly available data on actual bilateral exposures, makes it more 
134 diﬃcult to obtain a model that captures all empirical aspects of interbank loans fully, and every modeler has to rely on 
135 additional assumptions in this important aspect of the model. 
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Figure 2: Stylized balance sheet of individual banks 
136 3. The model 
137 We develop a framework that represents a stylized model of a real banking system. We model each bank individ­
138 ually through their balance sheets as well as their interactions with other banks arising from interbank loans that act 
139 as a transmission mechanism for any bank failures. While our focus is on interbank loans, this idea is easily extended 
140 to other ﬁnancial linkages such as OTC derivatives positions or payment systems without changing the key aspects of 
141 our analysis. 
142 3.1. The banking system 
143 Each bank i = 1, 2, . . . , N is assumed to have a balance sheet with total assets (and liabilities, as these have to equal 
144 total assets by deﬁnition) of Ai; we assume that all entries into this balance sheet represent current market values for 
145 simplicity. The assets are divided up between cash reserves (Ri) that include cash holdings and other highly liquid and 
146 risk-free assets such as treasury bonds, loans to customers (Ci) and loans to other banks (Bi). The liabilities of each 
147 bank consist of deposits by customers (Di), loans received from other banks (Li) and the equity (Ei). For simplicity 
148 we can identify the balance sheet of each bank by certain ratios; we deﬁne the capital ratio αi = EAi
i , the reserve ratio 
149 ρi = 
R
A
i
i 
, the fraction of deposits γi = DAi
i and the fraction of loans to customers βi = CAi
i . Thus a bank’s balance sheet 
150 is characterized by the quintuplet (Ai, αi, ρi, γi, βi).2 Figure 2 depicts schematically the balance sheet of such a bank. 
151 We will assume that the total assets Ai of a bank follow a power law distribution as has been found to be empirically 
152 valid. 
153 While this balance sheet does not capture all aspects of the real balance sheet of banks, e. g. there is no provision 
154 of ﬁxed assets such as buildings, the proposed structure includes all those balance sheet positions that make the vast 
155 majority of the total assets and liabilities and all those that are relevant for our analysis. A few additional assumptions 
156 are required in order to make our model of banks feasible for analysis. Firstly we assume that all interbank loans are 
157 overnight loans, i. e. they can be withdrawn at no cost at short notice. Furthermore, loans given to customers can 
158 be recalled only if the bank is liquidated; then banks are only able to recover a fraction 0 ≤ κ ≤ 1, common for all 
2In the remainder we will refer to the capital ratio as ”capital” for simplicity. Likewise the reserve ratio is referred to as ”reserves”, the fraction 
of depotits as ”deposits”, the fraction of loans to customers as ”loans”, and the fraction of of interbank loans given and received as ”interbank 
loans”. 
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159 banks, taking into account the costs of recalling these types of loans. This recovery rate might also be interpreted 
160 as the liquidity impact from selling assets in a banking crisis. We ﬁnally assume that no deposits are withdrawn or 
161 added, no new loans to customers are granted or repaid and the bank is not exposed to any other risks that could cause 
162 them losses. While these assumptions may seem very restrictive, they allow us to focus exclusively on the impact of 
163 interbank loans on systemic risk without being impeded by other factors. 
164 3.2. The interbank network 
165 In order to establish a complete banking system we need to model explicitly the network of interbank loans. A bank 
166 does not give a loan to every other bank and does not receive loans from every other bank, hence we need to determine 
167 those banks that have a loan arrangement. We therefore generate a random directed network of such loans using a 
168 Albert-Barabasi scale-free network, see Barabasi and Albert (1999), in which the number of outgoing and incoming 
169 links are correlated with the total asset value of the bank; this network gives us an adjacency matrix Θi j {i, j=1,2,...,N} . 
170 In this network structure an incoming link from another bank corresponds this bank taking an interbank loan from 
171 the other bank; an outgoing link therefore corresponds to a loan given to another bank. Using this network structure 
172 provides us with a power law distribution of the in and out degrees which was observed empirically as described in 
173 section 2.2, because we assume that the asset values Ai are following a power law distribution as outlined above. 
174 Therefore using this network structure provides us with a banking system that exhibits properties that were previously 
175 established empirically and that other network types, e. g. random networks, cannot provide. 
176 Once we have established which banks are linked by interbank loans we need to determine their size. We set the 
177 amount of the interbank loan bank i gives to bank j as Li j = Θi j � L j
i 
B
L
i
i 
, i. e. the amount lent will be larger the larger 
178 either bank becomes. Given that not all banks are interconnected this procedure results in balance sheets of banks that 
179 are no longer showing equal assets and liabilities; we thus have to make adjustments to the balance sheets which we 
180 describe in more detail in section 4.1. While these adjustments do not perfectly preserve the power law distribution of 
181 the assets and the correlation of total assets and number of interbank loans, the distortion is suﬃciently small to show 
182 no signiﬁcant diﬀerences to the properties of actual banking systems. 
183 3.3. The contagion mechanism 
184 The failure of a bank can aﬀect other banks through their ﬁnancial linkages. Below we describe two mechanisms 
185 through which ﬁnancial linkages can transmit such failures. The term contagion here refers to a situation in which 
186 the initial failure of a bank leads to the failure of at least one additional bank through one of these mechanisms. The 
187 extent of contagion is measured by the fraction of banks that are failing through these mechanisms. 
188 If a bank incurs a loss that exceeds its equity, the bank is wound up. In this wind-up process the bank calls in all 
189 interbank loans given to other banks as well as loans given to customers; from the latter the bank is assumed only to 
190 recover a fraction 0 ≤ κ ≤ 1. These monies thus raised are then distributed together with the cash reserves to creditors, 
191 where ﬁrst depositors are paid, any remaining monies are then used to pay interbank loans granted. If not all interbank 
192 loans can be repaid in full, all interbank loans get repaid the same fraction of the outstanding amount, thus assuming 
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Figure 3: Illustration of the default mechanism. Detailed explanations are found in the main text. 
193
 equal seniority of all interbank loans. If an interbank loan cannot be repaid in full, the bank granting this loan will face

194
 a loss of the diﬀerence between the outstanding amount and the amount actually received. This loss will then reduce

195
 the equity of this bank, which in turn might have to be wound up due to this loss if it exceeds the equity available. Any

196
 losses incurred from several banks to which a bank has granted interbank loans are cumulative, thus it may not be that

197
 the failure of a single bank alone would cause another bank to fail but only its aggregate losses from the exposure to

198 several banks that failed. We call this mechanism the default mechanism. 
199
 Figure 3 illustrates this mechanism. We assume that banks 1 and 2 are to be liquidated and thereby repaying their

200
 interbank loans to banks A, B and C for bank 1 and bank C for bank 2. The losses of banks 1 and 2 from liquidating

201
 customer loans does not allow them to repay their interbank loans in full. This leads to bank A incurring losses

202
 exceeding its equity and it will therefore be wound up in a subsequent step. Bank B has suﬃcient equity to cover

203 these losses and will therefore not be directly aﬀected and continue to exist, albeit with a lower equity than before. 
204 Bank C would be able to survive the losses incurred from either bank 1 or bank 2, but the cumulative losses from 
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205 both of these banks repaying their interbank loans causes cumulative losses exceeding its equity and it will therefore 
206 be liquidated in a subsequent step. It must be stressed that it is not necessary for banks 1 and 2 to be liquidated in 
207 the same step, but it could be that bank 2 was liquidated prior to bank 1 and the losses arising for bank C on this 
208 occasion had reduced its equity and once bank 1 was liquidated, these losses would have eliminated its remaining 
209 equity, causing it to default. The liquidation of banks A and C may then in subsequent steps causer other banks to fail. 
210 Another problem arises when calling in any interbank loans as the bank from which the loan has been called in 
211 will be required to fulﬁll this request using its cash reserves. If it is not able to do so, the bank will be wound up 
212 in order to obtain the cash required, employing the default mechanism described above, and thereby in turn call in 
213 interbank loans. We thus have a second mechanism which can lead to the failure of banks, the failure mechanism that 
214 arises from a cash shortage. This failure mechanism can lead to default as the recovery of loans to customers will 
215 depend on the recovery rate κ and a low recovery rate may not allow all interbank loans to be repaid, causing losses 
216 to other banks. 
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217 Figure 4 illustrates the failure mechanism. We assume again that banks 1 and 2 are to be liquidated and thereby 
218 calling in their interbank loans to banks A, B and C for bank 1 and bank C for bank 2. Bank A has insuﬃcient cash 
219 reserves to repay the entire interbank loan called in and therefore will be wound up in a subsequent step. Bank B has 
220 suﬃcient cash reserves to cover the interbank loan called in and will therefore not be directly aﬀected and continue to 
221 exist, albeit with lower cash reserves than before. Bank C would be able to survive if either bank 1 or bank 2 called in 
222 their interbank loans, but the cumulative cash requirements from both banks calling in their interbank loans exceeds 
223 them and it will therefore be liquidated in a subsequent step. It must again be stressed that it is not necessary for 
224 banks 1 and 2 to be liquidated in the same step, but it could be that bank 2 was liquidated prior to bank 1 and the 
225 cash reserves of bank C on this occasion had reduced and once bank 1 was liquidated, these cash reserves would have 
226 been insuﬃcient to repay this second interbank loan. The liquidation of banks A and C may then in subsequent steps 
227 causer other banks to fail. 
228 Thus the failure of a single bank can spread through the system and cause more banks to fail through either of the 
229 above mechanism and cause the contagion of the failure of more banks, a banking crisis. 
230 3.4. The trigger of a banking crisis 
231 The banking crisis is started exogenously by assuming that a single bank fails. This bank is assumed to suﬀer 
232 losses equal to its equity and is then wound up, starting the contagion mechanism described above. We are interested 
233 in the conditions that lead to the spread of this initial failure and how far it spreads, i. e. how many banks will 
234 be aﬀected. Hence, in contrast to much of the literature we do not seek to evaluate the performance of a generally 
235 weakened banking system, but that of a strong banking system with a single bank collapsing for exogenous reasons, 
236 e. g. fraud or losses arising from operational risks. This approach allows us to focus solely on the impact of interbank 
237 loans on the spread of any failures rather than investigating the inﬂuence of a generally weakening banking system. 
238 4. The computer experiments 
239 Given the complexity of the model outlined above, it is not possible to derive analytical solutions. We therefore 
240 employ computer simulations of a large number of banking systems with a wide range of characteristics in order to 
241 obtain data that can be analyzed in a subsequent step. 
242 4.1. Parameters used 
243 We investigate banking systems with N ∈ [13; 1, 000] banks, randomly drawn from a uniform distribution. For 
244 each bank we determine the total value of the assets Ai ∈ [100; 10, 000, 000, 000] drawn from a powerlaw distribution 
245 with power law exponent λ ∈ [1.5; 5], which in turn is drawn from a uniform distribution for each system. The 
246 recovery rate from loans to customers in cases where they have to be called in is drawn from a uniform distribution 
247 with κ ∈ [0; 1], identical for all banks in a system. The initial balance sheet of each bank is determined randomly 
248 with the parameters drawn from uniform distributions in the following ranges: the amount of equity is αi ∈ [0; 0.25], 
10 
249 the deposits are γi ∈ [0; 1 − αi], the cash reserves are ρi ∈ [0; 0.25], and the amount of loans given to the public are 
250 βi ∈ [0; 1] such that Ci = max {βiAi − Ri; 0}. 
251 After having set up all banks in the banking system, we determine the allocation of interbank loans as de­
252 scribed in the model above. Using L�i = 
�N
j=1 Li j and B
�
j = 
�
i
N 
=1 Li j we determine the new total assets as A
�
i = 
253 max 
� 
Ri + Ci + B�i ; Di + Li
� + Ei 
� 
and then adjust the other balance sheet items according to R�i = Ri 
A
A
�
i
i
−
−
B
B
�
i
i 
, Ci
� = Ci 
A
A
�
i
i
−
−
B
B
�
i
i 
, 
254 D�i = Ri 
A
A
�
i
i
−
−
L
L
�
i
i 
and Ei
� = Ei 
A
A
�
i
i
−
−
L
L
�
i
i 
. We use this adjustment to ensure that the balance sheets of individual banks are show­
255 ing equal assets and liabilities as well as retaining as much of the initial balance sheet structure as possible. The so 
256 adjusted balance sheets of banks are then used in the following analysis and it is this actual balance sheet structure 
257 that is used in the further analysis. Distortions in terms of deviations from the power law distribution of the size of 
258 assets are minimal as are any deviations in the correlation between assets and the number of interbank loans. 
259 We choose a single bank in the system to fail exogenously. The bank chosen can be the largest bank, the second 
260 largest bank in terms of their assets, or a random bank from each of the ten size deciles following these two banks. We 
261 let the contagion spread until no more failures are observed and record any failures of banks. In total we use 10,000 
262 banking systems as set out before, each triggered by 12 diﬀerent banks individually, giving a total of 120,000 potential 
263 banking crises to investigate with approximately 5,000,000 individual banks. 
264 Before investigating the results of the model and considering the variables we investigate, we brieﬂy illustrate the 
265 resulting networks and some of their key properties. Figure 5 shows representative examples of such networks for 
266 a range of power law exponents in the distribution of the size of banks (and thereby the number of interbank loans 
267 given and taken as per our model) and the number of banks in a banking system. We clearly observe that for low 
268 power law exponents there exists one bank that dominates the network in terms of size and also interbank loans given 
269 and taken. As the power law exponent increases we see that individual banks tend to dominate less and less with 
270 banks becoming more equal in size and the same is observed for interbank loans, reﬂecting the steeper drop oﬀ of the 
271 distribution of bank sizes. Banking systems with large power law exponents appear similar to random networks and 
272 the banks are of approximately equal size. We also see that for small power law exponents the network is tiered with 
273 a core consisting of a small number of banks being highly connected and a periphery that is mainly connected with 
274 this core but not exhibiting many links between them; as the power law exponent increases this tiering becomes less 
275 pronounced. Thus we capture a wide range of network types that cover the entire range of networks typically found 
276 in reality, as summarized in section 2.2. Key properties of the networks exhibiting diﬀerent ranges of the power law 
277 exponents are shown in table 2 and more extensive statistics can be obtained from appendix Appendix A.1 
278 4.2. Variables investigated 
279 In order to determine the main factors that aﬀect the extent of contagion, we will investigate the fraction of banks 
280 failing in a banking system, i. e. the number of banks failing divided by the total number of banks in the banking 
281 system, denoted FRACTION FAILING. 
282 As explanatory variables we use the balance sheet structure of the banks: EQUITY denotes the amount of equity 
11 
(a) 1.5 ≤ α < 2.0 
(b) 2.0 ≤ α < 2.5 
(c) 2.5 ≤ α < 3.0 
(d) 3.0 ≤ α < 3.5 
(e) 3.5 ≤ α ≤ 5 
For each range of power law exponents we show one representative network with a small number of banks (13 ≤ N ≤ 50), a mid-sized banking 
system (50 < N ≤ 200) and a large banking system (200 < N ≤ 1000). The individual banks are represented by nodes whose size is proportional to 
their relative size in the banking system they belong to and the interbank loans are the vertices whose thickness is proportional to the relative size 
of the loan. We only show the largest component of the network, eliminating any isolated nodes. 
Figure 5: Sample networks with diﬀerent power law exponents and sizes. 
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283 (capital) relative to the total assets of a bank (αi), RESERVES denotes the amount of cash reserves relative to the 
284 total assets (ρi), LOANS GIVEN denotes the amount of interbank loans given relative to the total assets (1 − ρi − βi), 
285 LOANS TAKEN are the amount of interbank loans taken relative to the total assets (1 − αi − γi), and SIZE denotes 
286 the absolute amount of total assets of a bank (Ai). 
287 The number of interbank loans given to other banks is denoted by NUMBER GIVEN while the number of inter­
288 bank loans taken from other banks is NUMBER TAKEN, i. e. they represent the outdegree and indegree, respectively. 
289 In addition to the number of interbank loans, we also investigate the concentration of interbank loans from and to 
290 individual banks, HERF GIVEN denotes the normalized Herﬁndahl index of the interbank loans given to other banks, 
291 deﬁned via the Herﬁndahl index as Hi = 
�
k
N 
=1 
� 
B
B
�
ik
k 
�2
, where N represents the number of banks, and normalized ac­
292 cording to Hi 
∗ = Hi− N 
1 
, see Hirschman (1964). Similarly, HERF TAKEN denotes the Herﬁndahl index of interbank 
1− N 1 
293 loans taken from other banks with Hi = 
�
k
N 
=1 
� 
L
L
�
ik
k 
�2 
and subsequently normalized as before. 
294 We furthermore investigate a number of variables that describe the network structure of interbank loans in more 
295 detail: CLUSTERING is determined as the local clustering coeﬃcient of a bank, see e. g. Watts and Strogatz (1998), 
296 and measures how close to being in a complete subgraph (clique) a node is, thus how closely integrated the bank is 
297 into its immediate neighborhood. More formally the clustering coeﬃcient is deﬁned as the fraction of possible links 
298 that exist between the nodes to which the node in question is connected. Another measure we employ is the SHORT­
299 EST PATH, that determines the maximum of the distance between any two banks in the banking system, restricted to 
300 the largest component of the network. We also consider the betweenness centrality, denoted BETWEENNESS, which 
301 measures how many shortest paths between any two banks pass through the node, see e. g. Freeman (1977). Thus this 
302 variable measures how much the network relies on the existence of this node to transmit any failures quickly. We fur­
303 thermore consider the average neighbor degree, DEGREE NEIGHBOR, which measures how well connected a bank is 
304 via interbank loans with its immediate neighborhood. We use the eigenvector centrality, denoted EV CENTRALITY, 
305 as a measure of the importance of the nodes. This measure indicates whether a bank is connected to other important 
306 banks and is formally obtained as the eigenvector associated with the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix. The 
307 node correlation, CORRELATION, explains whether highly connected nodes are connected to other highly connected 
308 nodes and is measured by the Pearson correlation coeﬃcient of the degrees between connected nodes, see Newman 
309 (2003). A good overview of these network properties and how to measure them is given in (Newman, 2010, Ch. 7). 
310 As we investigate the aggregate failure within a banking system and how the overall network structure aﬀects systemic 
311 risk, the unweighed average across all banks is taken for all variables. 
312 Apart from the properties of individual banks and their location in the network, we also consider some variables 
313 that describe the banking system as a whole: The total number of bank in the banking system is denoted as NUMBER 
314 BANKS, the fraction of assets recovered in case of failure is RECOVERY, the power law exponent λ of the distribution 
315 of asset sizes is given by DISTRIBUTION, the normalized Herﬁndahl index of the banking system as measured by 
316 the total assets is given by HERF BANKS. Finally we also record which bank has triggered the failures, denoted by 
13 
317 TRIGGER. We set this variable to 1 for the largest bank, 2 for the second largest bank, 3 for a bank from the top decile 
318 beyond these two banks, 4 for the second decile, and so on until 12 for the last decile. 
319 Table 1 provides an overview of the descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables we investigate, while table 2 
320 shows some key network variables across smaller ranges of the power law exponent of the size distribution of banks; 
321 the full descriptive statistics can be found in Appendix A.1 for information. 
322 Using these variables as dependent and explanatory variables we now can investigate what determines whether 
323 contagion occurs and if it does, the extent of the bank failures. In order to prepare for this step the next section 
324 describes how we obtain the main factors that we will consider in this analysis. 
325 5. Principal components analysis of the variables 
326 As discussed above, we consider a large number of explanatory variables, many of which will be correlated with 
327 each other, e. g. a network that is highly clustered will normally have a small shortest path. Despite these correlations 
328 between variables, they nevertheless provide information on diﬀerent aspects of the network structure and thus infor­
329 mation from both variables would be of interest in our investigation. Using a large number of potentially correlated 
330 variables will inevitably give rise not only to issues of multi-collinearity, but will also impede the appropriate inter­
331 pretation of the results obtained. In order to overcome this problem, we decided to employ a principal components 
332 analysis that allows us to reduce the number of variables signiﬁcantly and ensures that the variables considered are 
333 then uncorrelated as well as capturing the essence of these dependencies. 
334 5.1. The idea of a principal components analysis 
335 The idea behind a principal component analysis is to transform all variables such that they are uncorrelated with 
336 each other. This is achieved by a rotation of the data such that they become orthogonal. In mathematical terms we can 
337 state that our aim is to change the data such that the covariance matrix of the transformed data becomes diagonal, i. e. 
338 only has entries along the main diagonal indicating that the covariances between the transformed variables are zero. 
339 A more detailed description of this methodology can be found in Joliﬀe (2002). Below we provide a brief outline of 
340 the main steps in such an analysis. 
341 Assume our explanatory variables, assembled into a matrix X, have been normalized with mean zero and variance 
342 one, then the covariance matrix of these variables is given by Σ = N
1 
−1 XX
�. If we transform the variables into a 
343 new set X� = PX, we obtain a covariance matrix �Σ = N1 −1 X�X�� = N1 −1 P(XX�)P�. XX� is a symmetric matrix and as 
344 such it can be decomposed using the matrix of eigenvectors E of X: XX� = EDE�, where D is a diagonal matrix of 
eigenvalues. If we set P = E� and noting that P� = P−1, we ﬁnd that �Σ N1 −1 D, i. e. the covariance matrix of the 345 = 
346 transformed variables is a diagonal matrix. This implies that the transformed variables are uncorrelated and thereby 
347 should be easier to interpret than the correlated original variables. The transformation of variables is achieved by 
348 using the eigenvectors of the covariance matrix of our explanatory variables. 
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This table shows the mean values of selected network variables for networks with diﬀerent power law exponents in the distribution of size of the 
assets of banks. The detailed statistics can be found in Appendix A.1. 
CORRELATION 
log(HERF BANKS) 
NUMBER GIVEN 
NUMBER TAKEN 
CLUSTERING 
HERF TAKEN 
HERF GIVEN 
DEGREE NEIGHBOR 
log(BETWEENESS) 
log(SHORTEST PATH) 
log(EV CENTRALITY) 
1.5 ≤ α < 2.0 2.0 ≤ α < 2.5 2.5 ≤ α < 3.0 3.0 ≤ α < 3.5 3.5 ≤ α ≤ 5.0 
-0.4485 -0.1665 -0.0721 -0.0282 -0.0106 
-2.7378 -4.5757 -5.7222 -6.4787 -7.2231 
1.5236 1.2928 1.2174 1.1890 1.1717 
1.5241 1.2931 1.2190 1.1890 1.1715 
0.0555 0.0193 0.0076 0.0051 0.0033 
0.6729 0.6159 0.6085 0.6072 0.6074 
0.6738 0.6203 0.6046 0.5988 0.5956 
123.0041 18.3660 4.8925 2.8672 2.4319 
5.2774 5.4256 5.2061 4.8729 4.4276 
1.3364 1.6067 1.6641 1.6220 1.5046 
2.3139 -0.6766 -1.0870 -1.2980 -1.3216 
Table 2: Comparison of key network characteristics for networks with diﬀerent power law exponents 
349 The analysis thus far has not reduced the dimensionality of the problem. In order to select those transformed 
350 variables that are most relevant, we would therefore concentrate on those that contribute most to the total variance of 
351 the data. As the eigenvalues represent the variance of the transformed variables, it seems natural to focus on those 
352 that have the largest eigenvalues. A criteria to determine how many variables to choose is to consider all those whose 
353 variance exceeds the average variance. The average variance is 1, thus we would select those components whose 
354 variance, and thereby eigenvalue, is larger than 1. This criteria should ideally be complemented by a signiﬁcant drop 
355 in the next largest eigenvalue beyond those selected. 
356 Once we have selected the appropriate number of transformed variables, also called factors, we seek to optimize 
357 their values in the reduced matrix P to aid their interpretation. This is achieved by rotating the factors such that high 
358 absolute values are increased and low absolute values reduced closer to zero. There are various methods to conduct 
359 this rotation of which we choose the varimax methodology. Using an orthogonal matrix T we deﬁne R = PT and �N ��p 4 1 ��N �2� 
360 the criterion used is to maximize the expression V = k=1 j=1 r jk − p j=1 r jk over T, where ri j denotes the 
361 elements of the matrix R. The resulting matrix R contains the rotated factors as its vectors and these are used as the 
362 basis for further analysis and are presented below. 
363 5.2. Identifying the main factors 
364 Conducting a principal components analysis on our set of independent variables as outlined above, the eigenvalue 
365 criterion suggests we consider 6 factors as their eigenvalues are above the threshold of 1 and the seventh eigenvalue 
366 is signiﬁcantly lower. The resulting rotated factor loadings are displayed in table 3. In order to interpret the factors 
367 obtained, we identify for each variable the factor for which it has the highest factor loading and then seek to identify 
368 common features in those variables that allow us to interpret these factors in the appropriate way for the remainder of 
369 this paper; the names of these factors are shown in the top row of table 3. 
370 The variables associated with the ﬁrst factor are SIZE, CORRELATION, DISTRIBUTION, HERF BANKS, 
371 NUMBER GIVEN, NUMBER TAKEN, and CLUSTERING. All these variables are directly or indirectly associ­
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 ated with the network topology. The size of the banks, the Herﬁndahl index as well as the power law exponent of the

373
 distribution of bank sizes all determine important aspects of the degree distribution and how the banks are intercon­

374
 nected. The number of loans given and taken represent the average in and out degree, and clustering relates to the

375
 local network structure. Therefore we conclude that this factor represents aspects of the network topology and will in

376
 the remainder refer to it as TOPOLOGY. Looking at the relevant variables and their signs we observe that the value

377
 of the factor increases with a network that is more interconnected: NUMBER GIVEN representing the outdegree,

378
 NUMBER TAKEN the indegree, CLUSTERING the local connectedness, SIZE being proportional to the number of

379
 links of the banks, HERF BANK and DISTRIBUTION indicate more large banks with many connections, and COR­

380
 RELATION allowing for a more homogeneous spread of those links over the entire network by connecting highly and

381 less highly connected banks. 
382
 The second factor provides a good measure of the TIERING of the network. In a tiered network a small number of

383
 banks (the core) will be highly connected with each other and have connections to the remaining banks (the periphery),

384
 while the banks in the periphery are not much connected with each other but only to the core. This structure would

385
 imply a small shortest path as most banks will be connected via the core in only a few steps, but also a low betweenness

386
 as those in the periphery will have low values. Additionally, a core can easier be established if the banking system is

387
 large enough. It is exactly these parameters that load highly with the second factor and thus a higher value corresponds

388 to a more tiered network. 
389
 Those variables that represent the balance sheet structure of banks, EQUITY, RESERVES, LOANS GIVEN, and

390
 LOANS TAKEN are concentrated in the third factor and we therefore call this factor BALANCE SHEET. As a result

391
 of the signs of the individual variables, we observe that overall a higher value of this factor is associated with more

392
 loans being given and/or less deposits received, i. e. banks relying more on interbank loans rather than deposits and

393 equity to ﬁnance any loans to non-bank clients. 
394
 The fourth factor is associated with the Herﬁndahl index of the interbank loans given and taken, average neighbor

395
 degree and the eigenvector centrality, thus representing aspects of the structure of the interbank loans and how they

396
 are spread between banks. We therefore call this factor LOAN STRUCTURE. A larger value of this factor will be

397
 associated with the concentration of interbank loans given and taken to only a few other banks of a similar size (HERF

398
 TAKEN, HERF GIVEN, DEGREE NEIGHBOR), that have a high importance in the network (EV CENTRALITY).

399
 The ﬁnal two factors are straightforward as they are only associated with a single variable each, the recovery rate

400 and trigger bank, respectively, and for that reason we retain those names for these factors. 
401
 In the remainder of this paper we will only refer to these factors identiﬁed rather than individual variables. We

402 therefore brieﬂy summarize the identiﬁed factors and their interpretation for convenience: 
403 TOPOLOGY measures the interconnectedness of the interbank loan network 
404 TIERING provides a measure for the degree of tiering in the network of interbank loans 
405 BALANCE SHEET provides a measure for the reliance of the bank on interbank loans
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406 LOAN STRUCTURE measures whether banks provide loans to banks of a similar size to their own 
407
 RECOVERY is representing the recovery rate in case of bank failures

408
 TRIGGER measures the size of the initially failing bank

409
 6. Results of the model 
410
 In this section we analyze the main results from our model. We ﬁrstly consider some general distributional

411
 properties on the extent of the contagion before conducting a more detailed analysis of the inﬂuence the diﬀerent

412
 factors have on the likelihood of observing a banking crisis and the extent of contagion. The remaining parts then

413
 compare the eﬀects of banking systems with diﬀerent power law exponents in their distribution of bank sizes and

414
 conduct a comparison with random networks.

415
 6.1. Distributional properties of the contagion 
416
 Using the 10,000 banking systems we generated randomly as detailed above, we investigate in a ﬁrst step how

417
 many banks are aﬀected by any contagion. To this eﬀect we determined the fraction of banks that fail in each banking

418
 system in which we observe contagion and then aggregated these data to show the decumulative distribution, i.e. one

419
 minus the cumulative distribution function (CDF), as shown in ﬁgure 6. In doing so we also distinguished between

420
 the impact of diﬀerent trigger banks and power law exponents on the extent of contagion.

421
 Our results clearly show that while large banking crises are rare occurrences, they would nevertheless happen

422
 regularly. There is approximately a 1 in 1,000 probability that more than half of all banks are failing and approximately

423
 a 1 in 80 probability of more than 10% of banks failing. It has to be noted that this result does not include any eﬀects

424
 arising from the loss of conﬁdence in the banking system and the subsequent withdrawal of funding in such a case,

425
 although this would be highly likely in a real banking crisis and exacerbate the crisis. As would be expected, the

426
 larger the bank triggering a crisis, the more likely and widespread a banking crisis will be on average. Nevertheless,

427
 we found that on occasions the failure of a relatively small bank can cause a signiﬁcant spread of failures in the

428
 banking system. For a failing bank in the 9th decile in terms of its size, i. e. a relatively small bank, there is still a

429
 1 in 100 probability that more than 10% of all banks fail and in nearly 10% of cases at least one other bank fails as

430
 a consequence of such a small bank failing. Apart from the largest banks, the distribution of the fraction of banks

431
 failing does not vary signiﬁcantly with the size of the bank triggering the crisis. Another observation is that a larger

432
 bank failing initially increases the likelihood of contagion occurring, as we would commonly expect to be the case.

433
 These ﬁndings show clearly that it is not only important to focus on preventing the biggest bank(s) from failing

434
 (”too big to fail”), but also that small banks can have a signiﬁcant impact on the systemic risk. It is therefore important

435
 to investigate further in more detail what determines the extent of such crises, in addition to an investigation into the

436
 emergence of contagion itself.

437
 We also observe from ﬁgure 6(b) that the power law exponent of the size distribution of banks has a signiﬁcant

impact on the emergence of contagion as well as the extent of any banking crisis. We clearly see that a higher power
438
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(a) Cumulative distribution function of the fraction of banks failing in the banking system, divided by the size of the 
trigger bank (all banks refers to all 12 types of trigger banks being used in generating the distribution) 
(b) Cumulative distribution function of the fraction of banks failing in the banking system 
Figure 6: Cumulative distribution functions of the extent of banking crises, split by trigger banks and the power law exponent of the distribution of 
the size of the banks 
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This table shows the estimates of a logit regression on the probability of a banking system exhibiting contagion (Prob(CONTAGION)) and an OLS 
regression on the fraction of banks failing in those cases we observe contagion (FRACTION FAILING). We show the estimates of these regressions, 
with numbers in parentheses denoting the t-values, as well as a sensitivity measure. This measure uses the diﬀerence between the 25% and 75% 
quantile of the factor value (the number associated with CONSTANT and exhibiting a � is the value of the median for each factor for comparison). 
Prob(CONTAGION) FRACTION FAILING

Estimates Sensitivity Estimates Sensitivity

CONSTANT -1.0055*** 0.7035� 0.0173*** 0.0076� 
(-129.11) (81.49) 
TOPOLOGY -0.1392*** 0.0665 0.0047*** 0.0110 
(-28.79) (40.44) 
TIERING 0.0393*** 0.0169 -0.0056*** 0.0116 
(8.77) (-54.94) 
BALANCE SHEET -0.0810*** 0.0157 -0.0006*** 0.0006 
(-13.49) (-4.07) 
LOAN STRUCTURE -0.0036 0.0005 0.0133*** 0.0096 
(-0.65) (90.67) 
RECOVERY -0.0121* 0.0044 -0.0001 0.0002 
(-1.71) (-0.62) 
TRIGGER -1.2180*** 0.4209 -0.0052*** 0.0091 
(-146.23) (-27.36) 
Sample size 
R2 
119,988 38,280 
0.16 
Table 4: Logit and OLS regressions for the existence and extent of systemic risk 
439
 law exponent is associated with a more likely contagion, i. e. banking systems in which banks are more equal in

440
 their size are more vulnerable to systemic risk. On the other hand, however, the extent - measured by the fraction of

441
 banks in a banking system failing - of any crisis is smaller the higher the power law exponent is. Here the equal size of

442
 banks prevents the spread as most losses that spread will be relatively small, hence they will be more quickly absorbed

443
 within the banking system and less banks will fail. We also investigated the size of the banking system, as measured

444 by the number of banks, and did not ﬁnd any meaningful relationship with the likelihood and extent of contagion. 
445 6.2. Determinants of the extent of banking crises 
446 In order to assess the likelihood of observing contagion we conduct a logit regression of the probability of observ­
447
 ing a spread of the initial failure. As explanatory variables we use the factors from the principal components analysis

448
 as outlined above and show the results in table 4. We used the data from all 10,000 banking systems, each of which is

449
 triggered by 12 diﬀerent banks; we lost one banking system in our sample as it was totally disconnected and as such

450 no contagion could be observed. 
451
 Given the sample size of nearly 120,000 banking systems, a detailed analysis of statistical signiﬁcance is not very

452
 meaningful, although we observe that the LOAN STRUCTURE is statistically not signiﬁcant and RECOVERY is

453
 only so at a level of 10%. A more appropriate analysis would investigate the sensitivity of the likelihood of observing

454
 contagion to changes in the factor. To this eﬀect we looked at the 25% and 75% quantile of the distribution of the

455 factors and assessed how much a change of only this variable between those two values would aﬀect the dependent 
456 variable, assuming all other factors to be ﬁxed at their median. Looking at this sensitivity we see that the largest impact 
21 
457 arises from the size of the trigger bank; the larger the bank the more likely contagion becomes, as we would expect to 
458 observe. A larger bank has more connections and thereby the possibility to spread any losses wider. In addition the 
459 loans taken from other banks also tend to be relatively large, thus inﬂicting larger losses on them, that can more easily 
460 result in their subsequent failure. Furthermore, the interbank loans given will also be relatively large and calling them 
461 in is likely to exceed the cash reserves of the smaller banks, causing them to fail via our failure mechanism. 
462 The second most important factor is the network topology of the interbank loans; here we ﬁnd that a more inter­
463 connected network reduces the likelihood of observing contagion. A more highly interconnected network results in 
464 any losses being spread more equally amongst banks rather than only a few other banks as would be the case in a 
465 less connected network. Thus each bank will only have to take a relatively small loss and is therefore more likely to 
466 survive, thus the initial losses do not spread. The same argument also can be applied for interbank loans being called 
467 in and causing banks to fail through the failure mechanism. 
468 Furthermore, we observe that a less tiered network structure reduces the likelihood of observing contagion. In 
469 a less tiered network the initial losses are spread wider amongst banks rather than being focused on the small core, 
470 thus reducing the risk of losses quickly accumulating in the core and from there spreading out to the periphery. The 
471 ﬁnal noteworthy factor aﬀecting the contagion is the balance sheet structure. Here a larger reliance on interbank loans 
472 reduces the likelihood of contagion, which arises as with more interbank loans the relative losses from each individual 
473 loan defaulting reduces and thus the probability of another bank failing is reduced. For both factors the eﬀects arising 
474 from interbank loans being called in are comparable. 
475 Although those four factors are showing a statistically signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the probability of contagion, it has 
476 to be noted that only the trigger bank has any economically signiﬁcant impact. The other variables, even if changed 
477 considerably within its reasonable range, only have a limited impact on this probability, hence any policy measures to 
478 address the contagion using those variables will have a very limited impact. We can therefore conclude that the ”too 
479 big to fail” paradigm is supported for the emergence of contagion as it is mainly the size of the initially failing bank 
480 that determines whether contagion occurs. 
481 In order to assess the impact of the initial failure on the banking system in more detail we also investigated the 
482 fraction of banks that failed if contagion occurs. Table 4 provides the OLS estimates of a regression of this variable on 
483 the factors identiﬁed before. Focussing again on the sensitivity rather than the size of the coeﬃcients of the estimation 
484 and their statistical signiﬁcance, we clearly see that the most important factor is the tiering of the network of interbank 
485 loans. A more tiered network reduces the fraction of banks failing as most larger banks in the core will be linked 
486 with each other and their larger size allows them to absorb any losses more easily amongst them and the spread of 
487 failures will be limited. In particular, losses from the periphery are unlikely to spread as the core will in most cases 
488 be able to absorb these losses. It is worth noting at this point that while a more tiered network reduces the fraction of 
489 banks failing, it actually increases the likelihood of observing contagion as outlined above, although the impact there 
490 is relatively small. Hence it is not only the number of links between banks that are important, but the structure of any 
491 interconnections. 
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492
 The second most important factor for the spread of bank failures is the network topology. The more interconnected

493
 banks are by interbank loans, the more banks will fail. The reason for this ﬁnding is obvious: the more links a bank

494
 has the more its losses will be spread and close-knit banks may well accumulate losses from multiple banks and only

495
 because of this accumulation fail themselves. This inﬂuence is opposite to that it has on the probability of contagion in

496
 the ﬁrst place as once the capacity to absorb losses is breached, they will spread more easily in a closely interconnected

497
 banking system. Once again the impact of interbank loans being called in on cash reserves has an equivalent impact

498 in all cases. 
499
 The next important factor is the structure of interbank loans. A banking system in which loans are given amongst

500
 banks of more similar sizes actually increases the risk of more widespread bank failures as any losses will be quite

501
 substantial. The similar size of banks giving interbank loans to each other will result in relatively large loans being

502
 given, thus in the case of one bank failing, it will impose relatively large losses to those banks that provided these

503 loans, causing them to fail. 
504
 The ﬁnal important factor for the spread of bank failures is the size of the bank initially triggering the default. As

505
 would be expected, the larger the initial bank is the more widespread failures becomes; this arises from the fact that

506
 with a bigger bank the amount of losses that need to be covered are larger and thus other banks are more likely to

507
 be failing in turn. The other two factors, the balance sheet structure and the statistically insigniﬁcant recovery rate of

508 losses, have a negligible inﬂuence on the failure rate. 
509
 The inﬂuence of the four main factors on the failure rate is substantial and roughly of equal sensitivity. It is thus

510
 particularly noteworthy that the balance sheet structure has no meaningful inﬂuence on the spread of failures, but that

511
 network properties are clearly dominating. In contrast to the emergence of contagion, the paradigm of ”too big to fail”

512
 has only limited validity for the extent of a banking crisis but rather network aspects are more relevant. However, it is

513
 more than a simple ”too interconnected to fail” as the structure of these interconnections, especially the tiering, are of

514 relevance. 
515 6.3. The impact in banking systems with diﬀerent power law exponents 
516 One important aspect in modeling banking systems is to have the correct basic network structure of interbank 
517
 loans. What most importantly determines the network structure in our model is the power law exponent of the dis­

518
 tribution of the size of banks. We have chosen this value to be between 1.5 and 5, in line with empirical results for

519
 interbank loan networks, and it was part of the factors identiﬁed to inﬂuence the probability of contagion as well as

520
 the spread of any failure. Given the importance of this variable, we investigate the stability of our results if we restrict

521
 our analysis to banking systems that diﬀer only within a very narrow range of the power law exponent. As discussed

522
 above, ﬁgure 6(b) shows that a larger power law exponent reduces the spread of any failure, but at the same time the

523
 likelihood of contagion emerging increases. This provides us with a clear indication of a trade-oﬀ between those two

524 aspects that any regulator seeking to aﬀect the structure of the banking system has to be aware of, e. g. if through 
525 allowing for mergers the power law exponent is increased or decreased through the break-up of large banks. 
23 
526
 Table 2 provides an overview of the key network characteristics and how they change with the power law exponent.

527
 As the network increases its power law exponent, it becomes ever closer to a random network and this is reﬂected in

528
 the variables. For the subsequent analysis we followed the same steps as above, including the determination of factors

529
 that now will exclude the power law exponent and then conducted the same regressions. The factors identiﬁed are

530
 similar to those observed before when we did not distinguish banking systems with diﬀerent power law exponents, but

531
 we observe that the network topology as well as the balance sheet structure easily splits into two separate factors. The

532
 details of the factor loadings as well as the regressions with the parameter estimates are shown in appendix Appendix

533 A.2. Tables 5 and 6 show the sensitivities of the regressions as used before and we focus our discussion on this aspect. 
534
 From inspecting table 5 we clearly observe that as the power law exponent increases, the importance of the size

535
 of the triggering bank as the dominant factor in determining the probability of contagion, remains largely unaﬀected.

536
 As we observed before, the other factors are of much less importance. Nevertheless we do observe an increasing

537
 importance of the reliance of the bank on interbank loans (LOAN STRUCTURE) as the power law exponent increases.

538
 The same can be observed for the structure of the balance sheet while the opposite is true for the interconnectedness of

539
 the network (TOPOLOGY). Thus overall we do not observe a signiﬁcant diﬀerence to the results we obtained without

540
 splitting our sample up by power law exponents; this gives us an indication of the stability and validity of our results.

541
 Investigating the extent of the spread of bank failures from table 6, we observe that for higher power law exponents,

542 i. e. banking systems not dominated by a few large banks, the importance of the bank triggering the contagion is 
543
 diminishing as is the importance of the interconnectedness of the banks via interbank loans. On the other hand,

544
 the importance of tiering is remaining largely unaﬀected. This result re-enforces our previous assessment that the

545
 structure of the network, in particular tiering, is an important determinant of the spread of any failure. We conﬁrm

546
 here that the balance sheet structure does not play an important role in this assessment and the size of the triggering

547 bank is of less importance for larger power law exponents. 
548
 Overall we conclude that the results derived before when considering banking system covering the full range of

549
 power law exponents are robust to splitting the analysis up into banking systems with power law exponents in a small

550
 range. In particular the ”too big too fail” paradigm is again shown to be of limited validity and the network structure

551 to play an at least equally important role in the assessment of systemic risk. 
552 6.4. Comparison with random networks 
553 As a further assessment of the stability of our results we conducted an analysis using a random network of in­
554
 terbank loans rather than a scale-free network, thus decoupling the connection between the distribution of bank sizes

555
 and network structure. We maintained that the bank size has a power-law tail, but do not any longer assume that

556
 the number of interbank loans given and received is correlated with the size of the bank, but rather that the network

557
 structure is entirely random using the same overall connectivity as would have been emerged from a scale-free net­

558 work. Descriptive statistics of all variables considered are provided in appendix Appendix B. Firstly, inspecting the 
559 distribution of the fraction of banks failing as well as the probability of observing contagion in ﬁgure 7, we clearly 
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This table shows sensitivity measure of a logit estimation of the probability of observing contagion, in analogy to table 4. This measure uses the 
diﬀerence between the 25% and 75% quantile of the factor value. We show these measures for banking systems in a small range of the power law 
exponent of the distribution of the size of banks. The full details of the principal components analysis and full estimation results are presented in 
appendix Appendix A.2. 
TOPOLOGY 
TOPOLOGY II 
BALANCE SHEET I 
BALANCE SHEET II 
TIERING 
LOAN STRUCTURE 
RECOVERY 
TRIGGER 
1.5 ≤ α < 2 2 ≤ α < 2.5 2.5 ≤ α < 3 3 ≤ α < 3.5 3.5 ≤ α ≤ 5 
0.0214 0.0230 0.0044 0.0047 0.0009 
0.0284 0.0164 0.0065 
0.0072 0.0064 0.0102 0.0026 0.0144 
0.0351 0.0095 0.0019 0.0044 
0.0076 0.0152 0.0095 0.0077 0.0084 
0.0041 0.0104 0.0130 0.0136 
0.0019 
0.3636 0.4759 0.4367 0.4057 0.3582 
Table 5: Sensitivity of the probability of contagion on the factors identiﬁed from a principal components analysis 
This table shows sensitivity measure of an OLS estimation of the fraction of banks failing if contagion occurs, in analogy to table 4. This measure 
uses the diﬀerence between the 25% and 75% quantile of the factor value. We show these measures for banking systems in a small range of the 
power law exponent of the distribution of the size of banks. The full details of the principal components analysis and full estimation results are 
presented in appendix Appendix A.2. 
TOPOLOGY I 
1.5 ≤ α < 2 
0.0633 
2 ≤ α < 2.5 
0.0125 
2.5 ≤ α < 3 
0.0015 
3 ≤ α < 3.5 
0.0003 
3.5 ≤ α ≤ 5 
0.0004 
TOPOLOGY II 0.0010 0.0006 0.0001 
BALANCE SHEET I 0.0090 0.0016 0.0010 0.0002 0.0015 
BALANCE SHEET II 0.0039 0.0026 0.0006 0.0001 
TIERING 0.0104 0.0154 0.0180 0.0150 0.0130 
LOAN STRUCTURE 0.0028 0.0087 0.0055 0.0026 
RECOVERY 0.0016 
TRIGGER 0.0669 0.0227 0.0101 0.0057 0.0027 
Table 6: Sensitivity of the fraction of banks failing on the factors identiﬁed from a principal components analysis 
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Random network, Prob(CONTAGTION) = 0.3224
Scale-free network, Prob(CONTAGTION) = 0.3228
Figure 7: Comparison of the cumulative distribution function of the extent of the banking crises for random and scale-free networks 
560 see that there are no noteworthy diﬀerences between the two network types. 
561
 As we conduct a principal components analysis we identify eight factors that are more diﬃcult to interpret than

562
 in the case of scale-free networks, appendix Appendix B provides details of the rotated factor loads. We ﬁnd three

563
 factors related to the topology of the interbank loan network, two related to the balance sheet, one describing the

564
 concentration of interbank loans, one for the recovery rate and one for the trigger bank. No tiering emerges as a factor,

565 which is not surprising given that in a random network no such structure should emerge consistently. 
566
 Conducting a regression using these factors, we observe that the size of the trigger bank is the most important

567
 determinant of whether contagion occurs or not, see table 7. The only other factor that has a meaningful inﬂuence is

568
 BALANCE SHEET II, looking mainly at the liabilities and size of the banks. This result is in slight contrast to that

569
 of a scale free network in that no network topology factors have a meaningful impact on the likelihood of contagion,

570 although there the impact was also very limited. 
571
 With respect to the determinants of the extent of the crisis, we ﬁnd that the most important factor is again BAL­

572
 ANCE SHEET II, followed by the size of the trigger bank, TOPOLOGY II, mainly representing the eigenvector

573
 centrality, and TOPOLOGY I. While the interpretation of these results are not as easily conducted as in the case of

574
 scale-free networks, it nevertheless conﬁrms our assertion that the network structure is relevant for the spread of any

575 initial failure and should be taken into account in any assessment of the systemic risk of banking systems. 
576 Although the choice of network structure is important for our results, we ﬁnd some similar outcomes for a random 
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This table shows the estimates of a logit regression on the probability of a banking system exhibiting contagion (Prob(CONTAGION)) and an 
OLS regression on the fraction of banks failing in those cases we observe contagion (FRACTION FAILING). We show the estimates of these 
regressions, with numbers in parentheses denoting the t-values, as well as a sensitivity measure. This measure uses the diﬀerence between the 25% 
and 75% quantile of the factor value (the number associated with CONSTANT and associated with � is the value of the median for each factor for 
comparison). 
Prob(CONTAGION) FRACTION FAILING

Estimates Sensitivity Estimates Sensitivity

CONSTANT -1.0010*** 0.2921� 0.0142*** 0.0072� 
TOPOLOGY I 
(-129.12) 
0.0145*** 0.0059 
(65.20) 
-0.0034*** 0.0066 
(3.77) (-34.62) 
TOPOLOGY II 0.0157*** 0.0069 -0.0048*** 0.0102 
(2.70) (-35.48) 
TOPOLOGY III -0.0045 0.0009 -0.0004** 0.0004 
(-0.63) (-2.51) 
LOAN STRUCTURE -0.0090* 0.0010 -0.0033*** 0.0017 
BALANCE SHEET I 
(-1.70) 
-0.0054 0.0009 
(-27.29) 
-0.0030*** 0.0025 
(-0.88) (-19.44) 
BALANCE SHEET II -0.2006*** 0.0890 0.0079*** 0.0175 
(-48.27) (73.42) 
RECOVERY -0.0088 0.0031 0.0003 0.0004 
(-1.24) (1.57) 
TRIGGER 1.2110*** 0.4158 0.0060*** 0.0104 
(145.82) (30.62) 
Sample size 
R2 
119952 38683 
0.26 
Table 7: Logit and OLS regressions for the existence and extent of systemic risk in the case of random networks 
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577 network as for scale-free networks, providing further evidence for the robustness of our results. The properties of the 
578 interbank loan networks are shown to be an important determinant and should be included when assessing systemic 
579 risk. 
580 7. Policy implications 
581 Current banking regulation attempts to limit systemic risk by preventing banks from failing in the ﬁrst place, 
582 putting particular emphasis on large banks (”too big to fail”). The focus of most regulations, including the latest Basel 
583 III guidelines, is on the amount of equity and aspects of liquidity, i. e. balance sheet structures. Our above analysis 
584 suggests that the scope of regulation should be extended by taking into account the structure and extent of interbank 
585 loans and other ﬁnancial relationships between banks. It has become clear that the size of the bank initially failing is 
586 the main determinant whether the failure spreads, and hence any policy should pay more attention to larger banks and 
587 potentially have tighter regulations for those banks in order to prevent them failing and cause their failure to spread. 
588 This result is very much in line with the current thinking in banking regulation and is shown in our model to be a valid 
589 concern. It has, however, to be remembered that once the failure spreads, the inﬂuence of this variable on the extent 
590 of the crisis will be very limited and other factors, primarily associated with the network structure of interbank loans, 
591 will be become more important. 
592 Interestingly, the balance sheet structure, the main focus of current regulation with minimum capital requirements, 
593 maximal leverage and liquidity constraints, has no meaningful impact on whether contagion occurs. Thus, it might 
594 be a well placed approach to prevent the failure of a bank in the ﬁrst place (our initial trigger for the banking crisis 
595 that we assumed to be exogenously given), but it has very limited impact on systemic risk itself, be it to limit the 
596 occurrence of contagion or the extent of any banking crisis that develops. 
597 The implications of our ﬁndings are that regulators seeking to address systemic risk should pay particular attention 
598 to the network structure of ﬁnancial relationships between banks that determine the extent of any banking crisis. It is 
599 beyond the scope of this contribution to develop speciﬁc policy propositions that allow regulators to aﬀect systemic 
600 risk. Our results nevertheless suggest that in order to reduce the extent of any banking crisis, regulators should seek 
601 measures that reduce the interconnectedness of banks in the interbank loan market, and reduce the interbank loans 
602 given to banks of similar size. While direct interference in the interbank market might be unfeasible, any regulator 
603 could provide incentives to banks to take these aspects in consideration in their decision-making on providing and 
604 seeking interbank loans. How these incentives are best achieved remains unanswered at this stage. 
605 It should ﬁnally be noted that a more tiered banking system, i. e. a banking system which is dominated by a small 
606 number of highly connected large banks, is less vulnerable to large banking crises. Thus a higher concentration in the 
607 banking system is reducing systemic risk, provided a failure of those banks in the core can be prevented eﬀectively. 
28 
608 8. Conclusions 
609
 We have developed a model of interbank loans given and received by banks of diﬀerent sizes and with heteroge­
610
 neous balance sheets. Establishing a network of such interbank loans amongst banks with the number of loans being 
611
 correlated with the asset size of the banks, which follows a power-law distribution, we then continue to investigate 
612
 how the exogenous failure of a single bank spreads through the banking system and causes other banks to fail. We ﬁnd 
613
 that the determinants of whether a spread occurs includes aspects of the network structure, namely the interconnected­
614
 ness of nodes in the network and the tiering; the same variables also aﬀect the extent of a crises. The size of the bank 
615
 initially failing determines to a large degree whether contagion happens, with the network structure having only a very 
616
 limited inﬂuence. The size of the failing bank, however, has a very limited impact on the number of banks aﬀected 
617
 from contagion, it is the network structure that has a much more signiﬁcant impact on this measure of systemic risk. 
618
 Our ﬁndings clearly suggest that aspects of the network structure are a determinant for the likelihood of a banking 
619
 crisis and in particular its extent. In contrast, current regulation exclusively focuses on the balance sheet structure of 
620
 banks, notably the amount of equity required and more recently liquidity aspects, neglecting any eﬀects arising from 
621
 the network structure of interbank loans or other ﬁnancial contracts between banks. Our analysis suggests that this 
622
 aspect has only a very limited impact on the systemic risk, although it might be more important to determine whether 
623
 a bank fails initially and causes a banking crisis. This deﬁcit in current regulation has been shown to have a potentially 
624
 signiﬁcant eﬀect on the systemic risk that currently is not addressed. 
625
 Future research arising from this paper is manifold. Firstly, it would be worth looking at the determinants of the 
626
 failure of individual banks and establish how the local network structure aﬀects the likelihood of an individual bank 
627
 failing. It would furthermore be worth to investigate real banking systems by using actual balance sheets, even if the 
628
 interactions themselves are not known, with the aim to understand ﬁrstly how vulnerable banking systems are, but 
629
 also to understand how this vulnerability evolves over time. It would also be of interest to consider the importance 
630
 of the two mechanisms employed, the default and the failure mechanism, for the emergence and extent of contagion. 
631
 Finally we could extend our framework to determine an optimal regulation, e. g. by adjusting capital and liquidity 
632
 requirements to the network characteristics or even the individual position of a bank in the network with the aim 
633
 to reduce systemic risk. The banking system as developed here is free of any actual dynamics in the network itself. 
634
 Future work might want to include how interbank loans are granted, extended, and withdrawn in response to a banking 
635
 crises developing. This would allow to investigate how the actual behavior of banks contributes to or mitigates the 
636
 onset of a banking crisis. 
29 
637
 Appendix A. Detailed results of banking systems with diﬀerent power law exponents 
638
 Appendix A.1. Descriptive statistics for sample split by power law exponent 
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